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1 Introduction 
Every year, a large number of women immigrate to developed countries in East Asia as 
brides. This phenomenon virtually did not exist until the early 1990s, but foreign brides 
currently comprise 4 to 35 percent of newlyweds in Japan, South Korea (hereafter Korea), 
Singapore, and Taiwan. 1  This paper aims to provide the first economic study to 
systematically explain this phenomenon observed in East Asia on the basis of theoretic and 
empirical analyses. 
 Before we lay out our analysis, it may be worth emphasizing that the phenomenon of 
mass “bride imports” in East Asia deserves in-depth economic study for multiple reasons. 
For example, large-scale marriage immigration may affect numerous issues that economists 
care about, such as assimilation of immigrants and discrimination against immigrants and 
mixed-ethnicity children resulting from these cross-border marriages (see discussions in 
Yang and Lu (2010) and various media reports, including the New York Times (Onishi 
(2007)). Furthermore, a large influx of foreign brides coincides with the fact that many native 
women, particularly those who are educated, remain single.2 Given that families still provide 
a significant portion of support to retirees/elderly in the East Asia, these women who remain 
single may exacerbate the demand for formal social securities when they reach their 
retirement age. 
In addition, analyzing the bride imports observed in East Asia may help shed light on 
some topics that economists have been researching intensively. China, for example, had 
about 30 million more men than women at age 25 or below in 2005 (Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner (2008)). The excess men cannot be married in the domestic marriage market, 
and they arguably account for household savings for a marriage motive (Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner (2008)) and crimes (Inoue and Solon (2010)) in China. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to imagine that China may start importing brides from abroad to ease its marriage-
market imbalance. Given the cultural proximity and the large-scale bride imports, developed 
                                                 
1 In Hong Kong, less than 2 percent of Hong Kong grooms married brides from China in1991, but the figure 
grew rapidly in the 2000s and reached 39 percent in 2005. We consider these brides from China as marriage 
immigrants. However, we do not include Hong Kong in our analysis because of data limitations. For example, 
we could not access datasets informing us about marriage immigrants from countries other than China. 
2  This phenomenon has received much attention from the media around the world, policy makers, and 
researchers. Examples include the lead article “Asia’s Lonely Hearts” in The Economist (August 20-26, 2011), 
as well as Lee (2008), Park and Choi (2008), Sato (1988), and Wang and Chang (2002). 
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East Asian countries can be an informative setting for researchers to examine risk factors 
related to China’s potential bride imports. 
 This paper argues that the rapid improvement of women’s socioeconomic status, 
accompanied by a slow adjustment of household arrangements, accounts for the large-scale 
bride imports in East Asia. Within a theoretical framework, we show that the dramatic 
improvement in women’s socioeconomic status in a developed East Asian country raises 
women’s reservation utility for marriage, especially for highly educated women. However, 
its marriage-market institution (e.g., division of work and bargaining power in a household) 
has not adjusted enough to increase women’s gains from marriage accordingly. Therefore, 
some women, especially highly educated ones, find marriage unacceptable and remain single, 
which leads to an imbalance in effective sex ratios. As a result, men who are not attractive to 
women (e.g., those with low socioeconomic status) cannot find a match in the domestic 
marriage market and seek for a bride abroad, generating cross-border marriage. Furthermore, 
our model suggests that foreign brides tend to come from developing countries that are close 
to the developed East Asian country economically, culturally, or geographically. We present 
empirical results consistent with our model assumptions and its implications using various 
datasets from Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.  
An important aspect regarding the large-scale bride immigration is whether 
immigrants cause “brain-drain” in their home country, which could occur if immigrants are 
positively selected, in terms of education, for example (Borjas (1987)). Our empirical 
analysis suggests that foreign brides are, on average, more educated than their native 
counterparts, while our theoretical model generates ambiguous predictions regarding the 
direction of selection for marriage immigration. 
Why mass bride imports are prevalent in the developed East Asian countries but not 
in other developed country is an issue worthy of discussion, since developed countries have 
experienced women’s empowerment and slow adjustments in the marriage institution. 3 
Goldin (2006), for example, documents in detail that U.S. women who belonged to the early 
                                                 
3 A growing number of studies examine the relationship between lagged changes in institutions (social norms or 
cultures) and household formation in other developed countries. For example, in a U.S. study, Fernández et al. 
(2004) provide empirical and theoretical evidence that accounts for a lagged change in institutions captured by 
the perceptions of marrying a well-educated woman. Buchmann et al. (2008) attribute lower fertility rates of 
some developed countries (e.g., Italy, Spain, Germany and Japan) to a lagged change of social norms behind the 
enhancement of female labor-market opportunities.  
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cohorts that experienced sharp improvements in women’s status faced a tradeoff between 
career and marriage, just as well-educated Asian women today in developed Asian countries. 
Some readers may be skeptical about our hypothesis for the following reason: if the main 
mechanism behind the bride imports in East Asia is applicable to other settings, similar 
patterns may occur in the U.S. or other developed countries, but those patterns are not well 
documented. Multiple factors may account for the difference between East Asian developed 
countries and the others. First, developed East Asian countries have relatively lenient 
immigration policies for marriage immigrants compared to other developed countries. 4 
Moreover, developed East Asian countries have experienced more rapid change in women’s 
socioeconomic status; thus, they have had less time to ease the need for foreign brides, 
compared to other developed countries. Finally, strong gender norms in East Asian countries 
may account for the mass bride imports. Many sociologists and researchers in other related 
disciplines document that married men in East Asia barely participate in home production, 
regardless of their wives’ economic status (e.g., Tsuya et al. (2000)). This means that, all else 
being equal, women’s surplus from marriage in East Asia is smaller than that in another 
developed country that has no gender-role-related constraints in household decisions. 
Therefore, a reduction in the surplus of marriage may push women in an East Asian country 
to choose singlehood rather than marriage, while women in other developed countries may 
still view marriage is preferable to remaining single. We formally provide this mechanism in 
our theoretical model. 
Besides the studies discussed earlier, this paper is related to the economics literature 
on marriage pioneered by Becker (1973), especially to studies on the sex-ratio imbalance and 
its consequences in marriage markets (e.g. Edlund (1999), Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), 
Angrist (2002), Abramitzky et al. (2011), Lafortune (2011), see Buchmann and DiPrete 
(2006, Chapter 3) for an overview of the earlier literature). Our paper contributes to these 
studies by suggesting that the sex-ratio imbalance can be systematically transmitted to other 
countries through marriage immigration. 
                                                 
4 The International Marriage Broker Regulation Act enacted in 2005 in the U.S., for example, bans brokers who 
match Americans with foreigners for marriage, and it also restricts the issuance of K-1 fiancée visas. In contrast, 
such brokers are legal in developed East Asian countries and getting a visa for a marriage immigrant is 
relatively easy. In Korea, it takes less than 20 days to get such a visa. 
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This paper also contributes to the vast economic literature on immigration (Card 
(1990), Altonji and Card (1991), Borjas (1999)), in that non work-related marriage 
immigration may follow the same economic mechanism behind work-related immigration 
and that studying both types of immigrations can potentially be beneficial to understanding 
the nature of immigration and related outcomes. 
Finally, this paper is related to many studies on Asian marriage immigration in 
sociology and other disciplines (see a review in Yang and Lu (2010)).5 This paper differs 
from these existing studies in that we provide a formal economic framework and explain the 
underlying mechanisms behind the mass bride imports across developed Asian countries, 
instead of providing anecdotal or qualitative descriptions of the same phenomenon.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background 
information about cross-border marriages in East Asia. Section 3 presents a theoretical 
framework, and Section 4 shows our empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses additional issues 
regarding marriage immigration. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Institutional Background 
We use aggregate statistics from marriage records in Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, 
and plot the fraction of newlywed men whose brides are foreigners among all native grooms 
in each calendar year (Figure 1). By a “native,” we mean a person who holds citizenship of 
the country of interest, while a foreigner does not. For example, for Japan, a native groom is 
a groom who holds Japanese citizenship, while a foreign bride is a bride who got married in 
Japan but does not hold Japanese citizenship. The prevalence of foreign brides has increased 
over time in all countries except for Taiwan.6 Japan (blue line) exhibits a steady increase in 
                                                 
5 Economics studies of marriage immigration per se are rare but exist. Hryshko et al. (2011), for example, study 
the Danish policy change that bans an immigrant from bringing a spouse from his/her home country and the 
policy impact on the immigrants’ educational attainment. Nicely summarized in their work, many non-Western 
immigrants in Scandinavia choose their spouses from their country of origin and bring them to their country of 
residence. The marriage immigration in East Asia that we study is different from that in Scandinavian countries 
in two respects. One is that natives, instead of immigrants, bring a spouse from a foreign country; the other is 
that almost all marriage immigrants in East Asia are women, whereas a significant fraction of marriage 
immigrants are men in Scandinavia.  
6 It is possible that a foreign bride in a marriage record can be an economic immigrant who later married a 
native man, and most marriage records do not provide direct information distinguishing marriage immigrants 
and economic immigrants among foreign brides. However, additional surveys suggest that a significant fraction 
of foreign brides are marriage immigrants. In Korea, for example, about 79 percent of non-Korean women 
(including Korean-Chinese) who married Korean men came to Korea because of marriage; only 7.3 percent 
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foreign brides, reaching about 4 percent of all brides in 2007. Korea (red line) shows the 
most rapid growth in marriages between native grooms and foreign brides, increasing from 
less than 1 percent of all newlyweds in 1991 to 8 percent in 2007. In Singapore, foreigners 
consist of 30 to 40 percent of brides in 1999 and 2009. The graph for Taiwan requires 
additional explanation. The green line referred to as “TW_exChina” shows the fraction of 
Taiwanese grooms who have non-Taiwanese brides who are not from Mainland China, Hong 
Kong, or Macao. We use this data series because it is available for a longer time period than 
the number of all foreign brides. Note that that data series is highly correlated with the 
fraction of Taiwanese grooms who have foreign brides (including women from China, Hong 
Kong, or Macao) as denoted by the dashed green line. The fraction of Taiwanese grooms 
who have foreign brides steadily increased until 2004 but has dropped since. That is because 
in 2004 the Taiwanese government strengthened its immigration policies to discourage 
marriage immigration. 
 
Figure 1 Fraction of Native Grooms Who Have Foreign Brides 
 
Note: The graph shows the number of native grooms who have foreign brides, divided by the total number of 
native grooms who applied for a marriage certificate in each year. JP, KR, SG, and TW refer to Japan, Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan, respectively. TW_exChina excludes brides from China, Hong Kong, and Macao. 
 
The increasing prevalence of foreign brides is correlated with the improvement in 
women’s socioeconomic status in developed East Asian countries. As a proxy for the 
                                                                                                                                                       



















































women’s status relative to men’s, we use the difference in the fraction of college-educated 
among men and women. For this analysis, we focus our attention on individuals whose age is 
between 20 and 39, because they are presumably actively participating in the marriage 
market, and we calculate the fraction of college-educated for each sex (see Appendix 2 for 
the data source and other details).  
 
Table 1 Cross-border Marriages and Socioeconomic Settings in East Asia 
Year Natives Marrying a 
Foreigner a) 
College Educated b) Diff. in % 
Unmarried 























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A. Japan 
1992 2.6 0.9 36.1 -1.6 -3.2 3.3 102.1 
1997 2.7 1.0 39.0 -4.2 -4.0 2.4 102.6 
2002 3.7 1.1 41.6 -6.5 -5.0 1.7 102.3 
2007 4.5 1.2 47.9 -7.0 -3.4 1.0 102.8 
Panel B. Korea 
1990 0.2 1.0 31.0 13.2 -2.5 3.5 104.5 
1995 2.6 0.8 39.5 12.2 -4.9 3.4 103.9 
2000 2.2 1.5 46.8 8.5 -8.5 4.1 104.0 
2005 10.2 4.2 58.1 4.4 -6.8 7.3 103.4 
Panel C. Singapore 
2000 24.3 10.9 39.4 3.0 -4.6 10.8 96.6 
2010 35.0 13.2 63.3 -2.6 -10.5 7.8 94.5 
Panel D. Taiwan e) 
1998 5.9 1.2 25.1 1.4 - - 105.0 
2000 10.5 1.3 31.9 0.1 - - 104.8 
2005 8.6  2.3 49.8 -3.8 - - 103.4 
2008 4.0 2.1 55.4 -4.2 - - 102.2 
Notes: See Section 2 of the Appendix for sources and definitions for each country. a) Fraction of native grooms 
who married foreign brides (column 1) and that of native brides who married foreign grooms (column 2). b) 
Fraction of college-educated among men whose age is between 20 and 39 (column 3). The numbers in column 4 
are the fraction of college-educated men among men minus the fraction of college-educated women among 
women ages 20 to 39. College includes junior college. c) We use the population whose age is between 30 and 
39 to exclude individuals enrolled in a tertiary-education institute who may postpone their marriage because of 
schooling. For each sex and education level, we compute the fraction of unmarried people. We then report the 
difference in this fraction between the college-educated and non-college-educated (see details in Appendix 2). 
d) We use the population whose age is between 20 and 39. Sex ratio refers to the number of men divided by 
women times 100. e) Foreign brides exclude Chinese brides from Mainland China, HK, and Macao. The drop in 
the fraction of foreign brides in 2005 and 2008 is caused by immigration policy changes since 2000. The 
immigration policy changes include language proficiency tests, interviews, and refusal to issue a spouse visa if 
the age gap between a groom and bride is over 20 years (see Kim et al. (2010) for details).  
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Column 3 of Table 1 reports the fraction of college-educated men among men aged 
between 20 and 39, and column 4 reports our measure of the gender gap between men’s 
educational attainment and women’s. For all countries, the values in column 4 decrease over 
time, implying that women’s educational attainment relative to men’s has been improving. 
Specifically, the value in the first row (i.e., -1.6) means that the fraction of college-educated 
among women is 1.6 percentage points larger than that of men. Women’s educational 
attainment relative to men's is significantly correlated with the fraction of foreign brides 
among newlyweds (reported in column 1 of Table 3).7 A 1 percentage-point increase in 
women’s college education relative to men’s is correlated with a 1.04 percentage-point 
increase in the fraction of grooms who have foreign brides among newlyweds, and this 
positive correlation is significant at the 1-percent level (see Table O.1 of Online Appendix).8 
We postpone the discussion of the rest of Table 1 until Section 4. 
A substantial number of foreign brides met their spouses in connection with a 
“marriage tour” (Wang and Chang (2002), Seol, Suh, Lee and Kim (2009), Park and Choi 
(2008), and Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion in South Korea (2005)). 9  In a 
marriage tour, a marriage broker in a country, which we will refer to as the host country, 
recruits men looking for spouses abroad. Another marriage broker recruits a group of women 
outside the host country (e.g., China, Vietnam, or the Philippines). We refer to the country 
where these women reside as the source country. When sufficient numbers of men and 
women are recruited, the two brokers contact one other, and the broker in the host country 
organizes a group tour of the source country for the recruited men. The men and women have 
a few group dating sessions, during which they decide whom to marry. When they find their 
mate, they apply for a marriage license from the bride’s local government. Then the groom 
                                                 
7 The statistics from Taiwan require some explanation. First, because of data availability, the statistics reported 
in Panel D exclude brides from Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao (see details in Section 2.4 of the 
Appendix). Second, the decrease in the importance of foreign brides in 2005 and 2009 is caused by immigration 
policy changes. In particular, the Taiwanese government imposed stricter restrictions regarding marriage 
immigrants in response to the public outrage over foreign brides (Seol, Suh, Lee and Kim (2009)). Before the 
policy change was introduced, the fraction of foreigners among brides had continually increased. 
8 Online Appendix is available at www.soohyunglee.com/research. 
9 Developed East Asian countries have more lenient policies to provide visas for marriage immigration than the 
U.S. Furthermore, they have no legal restriction on the international marriage-brokerage agencies described in 
the text. In contrast, U.S. legislators enacted the International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2005 and 
started to restrict the issuance of K-1 fiancée visas because of the upsurge in cross-border marriages through 
such marriage-brokerage agencies. 
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goes back to his country and applies for a marriage certificate in his country, so that his bride 
can get a visa to enter his country as a legal immigrant. Grooms generally pay the brokerage 
fees, legal processing fees, and payments to the bride’s family. The total costs are estimated 
to be approximately 10,000 U.S. dollars.10 Until marriage, interactions between men and 
women are minimal because the process is rapid (about 10 days for the marriage tour and 6 
months until the women’s immigration), and communication takes place through interpreters 
hired by the marriage brokers because the man and woman often do not speak a common 
language.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
This section provides a simple theoretical model to illustrate our main argument of the 
interaction among women’s socioeconomic status, gains from marriage, and demand for 




There are two countries, R (rich) and P (poor). At time 0 in each country, a unit measure of 
men are born, as are a unit measure of women. Individuals are endowed with one unit of time 
and wage rates. At the beginning of time 1, individuals participate in a marriage market 
consisting of people from both countries (which we will shortly describe formally) and 
decide whether and to whom they will get married and in which country they will reside. We 
assume that a person’s wage rate and country of birth are observable to other marriage 
market participants. We assume that a married couple should live in the same country and 
that an individual born in country ܾ ∈ ሼܲ, ܴሽ can immigrate to the other country െܾ only if 
his/her spouse was born in country – ܾ. After marriage decisions are made, people conduct 
market and non-market productions and receive utilities based on their decisions. We denote 
by ݓ௜,௕ ൐ 0	with 	ܾ ∈ ሼܲ, ܴሽ, person i’s wage rate in country b and by ݓ௜ the wage rate in the 
country where person i chooses to reside at time 1. We assume ݓ௜,ோ ൐ ݓ௜,௉ to capture that 
                                                 
10 In Japan, the cost ranges from 10,000 to 15,000 U.S. dollars (authors’ own survey). Wang and Chang (2002) 
report 9,100 U.S. dollars as the average fee charged by agencies in Taiwan that brokered the marriages of 
Taiwanese men and Vietnamese women in 2000. In Korea, the cost ranges roughly from USD 8,000 to 12,000 
(Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion in South Korea (2005)). 
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country R is more developed than country P. For simplicity, we assume homogeneity in 
returns from immigration by setting ݓ௜,ோ equal to ߙݓ௜,௉ with ߙ ൐ 1. 
 
3.1.2 Utility from Being Single 
If a person remains single at time 1, person i’s utility depends on the consumption of market 
goods ܿ௜, leisure ݈௜, and non-market goods from home production ܪ௜ as follows: 
௜ܷ ൌ ݈݊ܿ௜ ൅ ݈݈݊௜ ൅ ݈݊ܪ௜.                                   
(1)  
With 0 ൏ ߩ ൏ 1, inputting ݄௜	unit of time yields ߩ݄௜ଵ/ଶ unit of non-market goods if person i is 
male and ሺ1 െ ߩሻ݄௜ଵ/ଶ	unit if person i is female. Having ߩ ൌ 0.5 implies that men and women 
are equally productive in home production, whereas ߩ ൏ 0.5 implies that women are more 
productive than men. Person i maximizes ௜ܷ subject to his/her time and budget constraints: 
݃௜ ൅ ݈௜ ൅ ݄௜ ൑ 1  where ݃௜  is person i’s time for market production, and ܿ௜ ൑ ݓ௜݃௜ . We 
denote the resulting utility as ܴ௜.   
 
3.1.3 Utility from Being Married  
Once man ݉ and woman	ݓ form a household and decide on a country of residence, they 
jointly decide how to allocate household income and time to maximize a weighted sum of the 
two’s utilities, subject to resource constraints: 
                  max ߤܷ௠ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻܷ௪                                                    (2) 
௜݃ ൅ ݈௜ ൅ ݄௜ ൑ 1 with ݅ ∈ ሼ݉,ݓሽ and	ܿ௠ ൅ ܿ௪ ൑ ݓ௠݃௠ ൅ ݓ௪݃௪, 
where ௜ܷ , ݅ ∈ ሼ݉,ݓሽ  is defined the same as in equation (1), and parameter ߤ, 0 ൏ ߤ ൏ 1 
governs m’s bargaining weight in household decisions relative to his wife	ݓ. We assume that 
ߤ is exogenously given, instead of depending on a person’s outside option. Different from a 
singles person, a married person shares non-market goods as public goods with his/her 
spouse, that is  
ܪ௠ ൌ ܪ௪ ൌ ܪ ൌ ߩ݄௠ଵ/ଶ 	൅ ሺ1 െ ρሻ݄௪ଵ/ଶ. 
That public good assumption implies that, in our model, marriage can be beneficial to both a 
husband and a wife compared to remaining single.11  
                                                 
11 Our assumptions for the household decision follows unitary models developed in the literature of marriage 
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If their birth countries are different (cross-border marriage), man ݉ and woman	ݓ 
will choose a country of residence by selecting a country that provides a higher weighted 
sum of the two’s utilities are defined as (2). Finally, we denote by ܷ௠,௪ and ܷ௪,௠ man ݉’s 
utility and woman ݓ’s from the household decision made by the two. 
 
3.1.4 Marriage Market 
Men and women from the two countries join a unified marriage market and form households 
on their own. A marriage-market equilibrium is a one-to-one correspondence from the set of 
men and women in the marriage market onto itself, and, at the equilibrium, by mutual 
agreement, neither one wants to deviate from his/her marital status, either by switching to 
remaining single or by forming a household with another person. 
We denote by ௜ܸ,௝ a person i’s net gains from marrying person j from the opposite 
sex, which is defined as: 
                                                    ௜ܸ,௝ ൌ ௜ܷ,௝ െ ܴ௜ െ ߜ1ሺܾ௜ ് ௝ܾሻ                                            (3) 
where ௜ܷ,௝	is the utility person i receives from marrying person j defined in Section 3.1.3; ܴ௜ 
is the utility person i receives from remaining single defined in Section 3.1.2; and 1ሺܾ௜ ് ௝ܾሻ 
is one if the two persons were born in different countries and zero otherwise. The term 
1ሺܾ௜ ് ௝ܾሻ with ߜ ൐ 0 captures the utility cost associated with cross-border marriage, such as 
the cost of immigration and the couple’s efforts to mitigate cultural differences.  
Two features of our marriage market are worth noting. One is that a person’s net 
gains from marriage ( ௜ܸ,௝ሻ depend only on his/her endowment and household decisions after 
marriage but not on transfers to/from his/her future spouse prior to marriage.12 This feature of 
our model follows a strand of marriage literature based on the “non-transferable utility 
assumption” (see Smith (2006)), which we discuss further in Section 3.3. The second feature 
is that an equilibrium of our model is stable matching, which we can compute from running 
the Gale-Shapley algorithm (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for details).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
economics. See Weiss (1993) for detailed discussions of alternative modeling choices for household decisions 
and gains from marriage. 
12 An example of studies allowing for transfers to (or from) his/her spouse prior to marriage is Borjas (1987). 
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3.2 Model Implications 
We first illustrate the way in which our model formalizes the relationship between women’s 
improved status and demand for foreign brides. We then examine other model implications 
that are empirically testable. 
 [P1] Women’s Improved Status, Effective Sex Ratio Imbalance, and Demand for 
Foreign Brides Suppose that the cost associated with cross-border marriage ߜ is sufficiently 
large so that all men born in country R prefer marriage with women from the same country to 
marriage with women from country P (referred to as C1). In addition, suppose that a man’s 
relative productivity in home production ߩ  is sufficiently small so that all men prefer 
marriage to remaining single (referred to as C2). Then, as each woman’s wage rate in country 
R increases, the effective sex ratio becomes imbalanced. In our model, a woman’s net gains 
from marriage decrease in her own wage rate (see Appendix 1). Therefore, all else being 
equal, an increase in a woman’s wage rate makes her accept a smaller number of men as her 
future husband. At the same time, the two conditions, C1 and C2, guarantee that all men born 
in country R may prefer marrying women born in country R to remaining single or women 
from country P. Therefore, a rise in women’s wage rates in country R can make a larger 
number of men from country R fail to find a spouse from among women from country R (i.e., 
an effective sex-ratio imbalance). At the same time, C1 and C2 imply that if a man from 
country R cannot find a spouse from among women from country R, he prefers marrying a 
woman from country P to remaining single. Thus, a rise in women’s wage rates in country R 
may increase the number of men from country R who would like to bring their wives from a 
foreign country P. Finally, our model implication for the negative relationship between a 
woman’s wage rate and her gains from marriage can be empirically supported if we find that 
a high-income-earning woman is more likely to remain single than her counterpart with a low 
income. 
[P2] Negative Relation between a Man’s Economic Status and His Chance to 
Marry a Foreign Woman Suppose that C1 holds. Then, if a man born in country R with a 
wage rate w marries a woman born in country R in an equilibrium, then another man born in 
country R with a wage rate higher than w will not have a wife from country P. This property 
relies on the fact that, in our model, all women prefer a man with a high wage rate to his 
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counterpart with a low wage rate (see Appendix 1). Suppose that the man with a higher wage 
rate marries a woman from country P in an equilibrium. Because of C1, the man will prefer 
marrying the wife of the other man whose wage rate is lower than his to marrying a foreign 
bride. Likewise, the wife of the other man prefers marrying the man with a higher wage rate 
than her current husband. Therefore, the two will form a blocking pair, contradicting the 
assumption that such an assignment is an equilibrium (stable matching). 
[P3] Selection into Foreign Brides Our model generates ambiguous predictions 
regarding the selection process for being foreign brides; that is, whether or not a high-wage 
rate woman from country P is more likely to be a foreign bride than her counterpart with a 
low-wage rate (positive selection vs. negative selection). For example, consider the case in 
which a woman’s wage rate increases her husband’s utility from marriage. Then, if all 
women born in country P are willing to marry men from country R, then a woman with a 
high wage rate from country P is more likely to be a foreign bride to a man from country R 
(i.e., positive selection). Alternatively, negative selection can be observed, for example, if a 
woman’s willingness to become a foreign bride decreases in her wage rate. 
[P4] Positive Relationship between Proximity and Export of Brides In our model, a 
cross-border marriage provides a higher utility to both the husband and the wife if the 
associated cost ߜ decreases. It is reasonable to assume that the cost is negatively correlated 
with cultural and economic ties between the two countries, which can be accounted for by 
geographical distance and trade volumes. Then, the model predicts that, all else being equal, 
country P exports more women as brides to country R as the ties between the two countries 
become stronger.  
[P5] Positive Relationship between the Development Gap and Export of Brides As 
the wage gap between the two countries ߙ increases, a larger number of women in country P 
want to be brides for men born in country R. This is because an increase in ߙ  raises a 
woman’s returns from marriage immigration to country R and the wage of her husband born 
in country R relative to men born in country P. This property implies that, all else being 
equal, country P’s chance to export its women as brides to country R increases as ߙ , 
capturing the two countries’ development gap, increases. 
[P6] Role of Home Production in Demand for Foreign Brides Our model assumes 
that married men cannot participate in home production, which is consistent with empirical 
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patterns in East Asian countries (see Section 4.5). If a married man can freely input his time 
to home production, our model implies that the improved socioeconomic status of women in 
country R does not necessarily increase its demand for foreign brides. This property exists for 
two reasons. First, since marriage gains are larger without constraint than with constraint, a 
woman may find a man unacceptable as a husband if he cannot participate in home 
production, but she may find him acceptable if he can. Second, if men can participate in 
home production, women no longer uniformly prefer a high-wage man to a low-wage man, 
which may enable a low-wage man to be acceptable to a wider range of women as a husband. 
This prediction implies that, all else being equal, the demand for foreign brides will be larger 




Our model aims to provide a simple theoretical framework to formalize our hypothesis of 
socioeconomic factors that may account for the rapid increase in foreign brides in East Asia. 
To achieve this goal, we simplify our theoretical model in various respects. Two issues are 
especially noteworthy. 
First, our model follows the literature using the non-transferable utility (NTU) 
assumption to form a person’s preference among potential spouses (see Weiss (1993), Smith 
(2006) and Lundberg and Pollak (2007) for details). Alternatively, we could use the 
transferable utility assumption (TU)--that a person can transfer a part of the utility from 
marriage to his/her future spouse (e.g., Becker, 1974, Choo and Siow, 2005, Chiaporri et al, 
2009)--and generate model predictions similar to those described in Section 3.2. We use the 
NTU assumption instead of the TU assumption, partly because we think the NTU assumption 
is more appropriate to capture the reality of marriage markets in East Asia. For example, less 
than 4 percent of Koreans between the ages of 20 and 39 agree with the argument that only 
wives should perform household chores (Korean National Statistical Office, 2010), but in 
reality, husbands rarely participate in home production, which we will discuss in Section 4.5. 
This stark gap between a man’s stated preference and actual participation in home production 
suggests the possibility that people may not keep their promises made prior to marriage. 
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Under this limited commitment environment, the marriage surplus may not be fully 
transferred between a husband and wife, different from the TU model. 
Second, we abstract the possibility that a person born in country R could marry another 
person born in a country richer than country R. As we will discuss in Section 5.2, we abstract 
this possibility because such marriages are negligible in developed East Asian countries. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Woman’s Status, Likelihood of Being Single, and Demand for Foreign brides 
This subsection examines the first model implication P1 in Section 3.3 by approximating a 
woman’s wage rate with her educational attainment. As explained in Section 2, we find that 
women’s improved status, as measured by their college education, is positively correlated 
with the prevalence of foreign brides in developed Asian countries. Next, we examine the 
relation between a woman’s socioeconomic status and her likelihood of remaining single by 
focusing on women whose age is between 30 and 39. We use this age group because these 
women are young enough to capture the cohorts who experienced rapid improvement in 
women’s socioeconomic status but old enough to have completed their education. Note that 
our results are robust to using different age criteria (e.g., using 35 to 44 instead of 30 to 39). 
We calculate the fraction of singles among college-educated women and women without a 
college degree. We then report the difference between the two fractions in column 6 of Table 
1. A positive value means that a larger fraction of college-educated women remain single 
compared to women without tertiary education. Consistent with our model implication, we 
find that college-graduate women more often remain single than those without a college 
degree in all four developed countries across all censuses. 
 
4.2 A Man’s Socioeconomic Status and His Likelihood of Marrying a Foreign Woman 
An ideal dataset for testing our model implication P2, the negative relationship between a 
man’s status and his likelihood of marrying a foreign bride, includes both single and married 
individuals and has information about the nationality of a person and his/her spouse if the 
person is married. There is, however, no such dataset in the four East Asian countries, to the 
best of our knowledge. The datasets closest to the ideal are the administrative datasets of 
marriage records from Japan (2000 and 2005) and Korea (2004 and 2005). The Japanese and 
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Korean marriage records provide the age of a bride and her groom, marital history, 
employment status, occupation, current location of residence, and citizenship. By marital 
history, we mean whether a person had been married prior to his or her current marriage. 
Korean marriage records also collect information about educational attainment, which is not 
available in Japanese marriage records (see Appendix Section 2 and Online Appendix 
Section C for data sources and summary statistics). 
 
Table 2 Likelihood of Having a Foreign Spouse  
Probit Model: Marginal effects reported 
 Native Grooms Native Brides 
 Japan Korea Japan Korea 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.0003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.00001) (0.000) 
High school - 0.076*** - 0.013*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Middle school or less - 0.165*** - 0.041*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Managerial job -0.004*** -0.010*** 0.0007** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) 
Service and retailer sector 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.026*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) 
Agricultural sector 0.006*** 0.069*** -0.005*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Production job 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.028*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.002) 
Military/Security service -0.010*** -0.035*** -0.003*** 0.005 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
Not working – Student - 0.039*** - 0.043*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Not working – Non-student -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.024*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.000) 
Large firm -0.011*** - -0.002***  
 (0.000)  (0.0002)  
Pseudo R-sq 0.17 0.30 0.01 0.16 
No. obs. 1,455,349 534,327 1,415,946 501,575 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The omitted categories are “junior college or more” for education and 
“white collar” jobs for occupation. Year dummy variables are included. Large firm includes those working for a 
firm that employs 100 or more workers or those who are in management. Low-skilled job refers to production 
workers for Japan. Not working includes both students and non-students who do not have a job for Japan. The 
asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 If our model prediction holds in reality, then a man’s likelihood of having a foreign 
bride will be negatively correlated with his educational attainment and having a well-paid job 
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(e.g., working for a firm employing 100 or more workers in Japan, and having a managerial 
job in Korea). Using a Probit model, we regress a dummy indicating whether a groom has a 
foreign bride on all variables available in each country’s marriage records. The results are 
consistent with our model prediction (see Table 2). For instance, all else being equal, a high-
school-graduate groom in Korea is 7.6 percentage points more likely to have a foreign bride 
than his counterpart with a college degree. We conduct various robustness checks using 
imputed education and income, and our results remain qualitatively the same (see Online 
Appendix: Section C and Table O.4).  
A possible concern regarding the Probit analysis described above is that selection 
into marriage may account for our finding of a negative correlation between a man’s 
socioeconomic status and the probability of having a foreign bride. For example, it is 
possible that an educated man may remain single rather than having a foreign bride more 
often than his less-educated counterparts. However, we argue that this possibility is unlikely 
to account for the negative correlation we found. As reported in column 5 of Table 1, a man’s 
chance of getting married is positively correlated with his educational attainment in both 
Japan and Korea. Therefore, selection bias may mitigate the negative correlation between a 
man’s socioeconomic status and his chance of having a foreign bride, instead of causing a 
negative correlation in our sample. 
 
4.3 Selection for Being a Foreign Bride 
Our model allows for both positive and negative selections for being a foreign bride. Thus, 
we empirically examine which of the two is more likely to occur. We compare the 
educational attainment of female marriage immigrants with their peers remaining in their 
home countries. We conduct this analysis only for marriage immigrants to Korea because of 
data availability.13 We further narrow our sample to brides from China, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines because they make up most of the foreign brides in Korea. The first rows in each 
panel of Table 3 report the distribution of foreign brides’ educational attainment depending 
on what country the women came from. The second rows in each panel report the distribution 
                                                 
13 For the 2005 Chinese census, we use the cross-tabulation of sex, age, and educational attainment provided by 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The tabulation reports the number of individuals in each category. 
The censuses of Vietnam (1999) and the Philippines (2000) are available at IPUMS international. Because some 
brides from Vietnam and the Philippines were too young to have completed their educational attainment in the 
census year, we limit our sample to foreign brides who were over 19 years old when the census was carried out. 
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of educational attainment for the women from the same country.14 Note that we use weights 
that make the weighted distributions of cohorts in the census of China, Vietnam, or the 
Philippines the same as the raw distributions of cohorts among foreign brides from each of 
these three countries. We find that, overall, foreign brides are generally more educated than 
the women in their home countries, and the difference is statistically significant based on 
Kolmogorov and Smirnov tests. Interestingly, Filipino brides are more educated, on average, 
than their peers in the Philippines, as well as female overseas workers. 
 
Table 3 Education of Foreign Brides in Korea  
Compared to Peers in their Home Countries 
Unit: Percent 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Panel A. Chinese    
   Brides 5.78 87.26 6.96 
   Population (Women) 27.18 64.72 8.11 
Panel B. Vietnamese    
   Brides 6.13 85.34 8.53 
   Population (Women) 35.92 57.77 6.31 
Panel B. Filipino    
   Brides 1.31 46.42 52.27 
   Population (Women) 22.37 39.33 38.30 
   Population (Female overseas workers) 13.64 36.89 49.47 
Source: Marriage Records of Korea (2004, 2005) and Population Censuses of China (2005), Vietnam (1999), 
and the Philippines (2000). 
 
4.4 Export of Brides, Proximity, and the Development Gap 
This subsection tests the model predictions P4 and P5, regarding the effect of a country’s 
proximity and relative development to developed East Asian countries on its bride exports. 
We compile a cross-country dataset of 193 potential countries from which a developed East 
Asian country could bring a foreign bride in 2005. We use geographical distance and the 
trade volume between two countries as a proxy for the two countries’ proximity, while we 
use the difference in GDP per capita as a proxy for the wage premium (discount) that a 
person receives from moving from one country to another.15 We estimate a Tobit model to 
                                                 
14 It is possible that marriage immigrants may be included in the census of their home country. However, the 
number of marriage immigrants to Korea is much smaller than the number of women in the census and thus will 
not affect our findings. 
15 For Korea and Japan, we used the World Bank Development Indicator to collect all variables except for 
physical distance. For physical distance between two countries, we use a dataset from the CEPII. The CEPII 
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quantify the relationship between the logarithm of the number of brides from a country to a 
developed Asian country and explanatory variables because the dependent variable is often 
censored.16 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 report the results based on a pooled sample of Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan.17  Consistent with our model prediction P4, negative coefficients of 
geographical distance and positive coefficient of trade volumes suggest that the number of 
female marriage immigrants from a country is positively correlated with the country’s 
socioeconomic ties to a host country. To test our prediction regarding development gap P5, 
we use two variables: |lnYH-lnYS|+ is the absolute value of the per-capita GDP gap between 
the two countries if the destination country H is more developed than country S, and zero 
otherwise. Likewise, |lnYH-lnYS|- is the absolute value of per-capita GDP gap if country S is 
more developed than country H, and zero otherwise. Note that we refer to a developed East 
Asian country as a host country as it hosts a couple from the cross-border marriage that we 
analyze, and we refer to the country where a foreign bride currently resides as the source 
country. 
If the model prediction P5 holds, then the coefficient of |lnYH-lnYS|+ will be 
positive, which is supported by our results reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. For 
example, column 1 suggests that a 1-percent increase in the GDP per capita gap is correlated 
with 1.8 percent increase in the number of brides from the country, controlling for 
                                                                                                                                                       
provides two measures of distance between the two countries. One is the physical distance between the two 
capital cities. The other is the population-weighted distance based on multiple locations. We use the first 
measure because it is available for a large number of countries and is highly correlated with population-
weighted distance. For Taiwan, we gather GDP per capita from the World Bank Development Indicator, trade 
volume from the Bureau of Foreign Trade of Republic of China, and physical distance from GEOBYTE and 
GlobeFeed. 
16 The 2005 Korean marriage record allows people to report their nationalities from over 200 countries, and our 
dataset records a country that has zero bride export to Korea if no woman in 2005 chose it as her nationality. 
Our dataset for Taiwan includes a person’s nationality out of 25 countries and “Other.” We consider a country’s 
bride export to Taiwan as zero if there is no foreign bride from that country or the country is classified as the 
rest. A Japanese marriage record classifies a person’s nationality into 10 countries and the rest. We take a 
country’s bride export to Japan as zero if there are no foreign brides from that country or the country is 
classified as “Other.” This limited information related to a person’s nationality observed in Taiwan and Japan 
has, we believe, only limited effects on our results because the countries a person can choose for his/her 
nationality in Taiwanese or Japanese marriage records are the major countries from which brides originate. 
Furthermore, the difference in censoring across the three countries is captured by the host-country dummies in 
our pooled sample analysis, as described in Table 4. 
17 Our regression analysis follows the gravity models popularly used in international trade literature. We omit 
our analysis for Singapore because we do not have sufficient information about the nationalities of marriage 
immigrants. 
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geographical and economic proximity. It is worth noting that the coefficients of |lnYH-lnYS|- 
will be negative if the mechanism behind P5 holds between a developed Asian country and 
another country that is more developed than that Asian country. However, we find no 
significant relationship between |lnYH-lnYS|- and the logarithm of the number of foreign 
brides. This finding emerges because only a limited number of countries are more developed 
than Japan, Korea, or Taiwan and because female immigration from those countries is small 
and idiosyncratic. Our findings remain qualitatively the same across various robustness 
checks (see Table O.5 of Online Appendix). 
One may be concerned about the possibility that the GDP gap |lnYH-lnYS|+ reflects 
the proximity of two countries that cannot be captured by trade volume or physical distance. 
We argue that this possibility is unlikely to hold in our sample for the following reason. If 
|lnYH-lnYS|+ captures proximity between a developed Asian country and another country, 
then it will be positively correlated with other types of immigrants, such as male marriage 
immigrants to the developed Asian country. However, we find that |lnYH-lnYS|+ has no 
strong relationship with the inflow of male marriage immigrants to developed Asian 
countries (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 4).  
 
Table 4 Source Countries of Foreign Spouses 
Tobit Model: Coefficients Reported 
 Log (Brides) Log (Grooms) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
|lnYH-lnYS|+ 1.793*** 2.249*** 1.120* 0.782 
 (0.645) (0.712) (0.639) (0.681) 
|lnYH-lnYS|- 1.083 0.447 2.994 3.734* 
 (2.348) (2.369) (2.120) (2.234) 
ln (Trade) 2.116*** 2.105*** 3.113*** 3.140*** 
 (0.407) (0.389) (0.588) (0.583) 
ln (Distance) -3.842*** -2.917*** -0.035 -0.650 
 (1.023) (1.206) (1.041) (1.183) 
Region Dummy No Yes No Yes 
% with Non Zero 8.23 8.23 7.74 7.74 
No obs. 462 462 462 462 
PseudoR2 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.34 
Note: The unit of observations is the country from which Japan, Korea, or Taiwan would bring marriage 
immigrants. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The pooled regression model 
includes host country dummy variables. Region dummy variables are defined for 6 regions: East Asia and 




4.5 Role of Home Production in the Demand for Foreign Brides 
This subsection provides evidence supporting our model assumptions regarding married 
men’s home production in developed East Asian countries. Note that we omit testing the 
model prediction P6 because we do not have information about the number of foreign brides 
in other developed countries. If we did, we could have tested P6 by examining the correlation 
between a country’s amount of foreign brides and married men’s participation in home 
production. 
 
Table 5 Husband’s Time on Household Duties in Japan, Korea, and the U.S. 
OLS regression, Pooled Sample of Married Men (aged 30 to 59), Minutes a Day  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Japan -127.234*** -128.332*** -119.145*** 
 (5.202) (5.266) (4.998) 
Korea -118.914*** -112.551*** -104.731*** 
 (5.260) (6.044) (5.740) 
Constant 167.216*** 418.445*** 471.843*** 
 (5.145) (69.595) (65.996) 
Own and wife’s: age, age-
squared, college education, 
no. of children 
No Yes Yes 
Own and wife’s: labor 
force participation 
No No Yes 
Observations 55,372 55,372 55,372 
R-squared 0.17 0.19 0.21 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Sampling weight is reconstructed so that three countries have the same weight in total. Labor-force participation 
is defined by usual employment status. 
 
Our theoretical model in Section 3 assumes that a married man in a developed East 
Asian country does not participate in home production. This assumption is used to capture a 
socioeconomic condition in East Asia, where a married woman is expected to perform most 
of home production regardless of her and her husband’s comparative advantages. Consistent 
with our assumption, many researchers report that East Asian countries still retain a 
traditional gender norm, setting an expectation that women take care of all household duties 
(see Jones (2012)).  
Our assumption of constraining a married man’s home production as zero in a 
developed Asian country is stark but not far from the reality. We analyze time-use surveys 
from Japan, Korea, and the U.S. by focusing on married men whose age is between 30 and 
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59.18 On average, married men in the U.S. spend 167 minutes per day in home production, 
whereas Japanese husbands spend only 40 minutes and Korean husbands spend 48 minutes. 
The difference between Japan/Korea and the U.S. is statistically significant (see column 1 of 
Table 5). Our finding that husbands in Japan and Korea spend much less time than their U.S. 
counterparts still holds when we include detailed control variables, including a man and his 
wife’s labor-market status (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 5). Specifically, we estimate an 
OLS regression and find that Japanese or Korean husbands spend around 110 minutes a day 
less than their U.S. counterparts, even after we control for detailed characteristics of a 
married man and his spouse, as well as his household characteristics. 
 
5. Discussions 
This section discusses two alternative mechanisms that may account for the prevalence of 
foreign brides in East Asia (sections 5.1 and 5.2). We then discuss whether the increasing 
importance of foreign brides in East Asia is likely to continue over time or is a temporary 
phenomenon (section 5.3). 
 
5.1 Sex Ratio Imbalance in Sub-Populations 
Contrary to our main hypothesis, a reader might consider that raw sex-ratio imbalances may 
account for the increase in foreign brides. For example, it is possible that raw ratios among 
people participating in the marriage market may become more imbalanced over time. To 
examine this possibility, we report raw sex ratios among people whose age is between 20 and 
40, the prime cohort searching for a spouse, in each calendar year (column 7 of Table 1). The 
decrease in sex ratios means that, all else being equal, a man will be in a better position for 
finding a spouse in his marriage market; therefore, if a sex-ratio imbalance among marriage-
market participants causes the demand for foreign brides, then the sex ratios should be 
positively correlated with the demand for foreign brides. In contrast, we find that raw sex 
                                                 
18 We used the Korea time-use survey (Saeng-whal-shi-gan-cho-sa) 2009, the Japan time-use survey (Shakai Sei
katsu Kihon Chosa) 2006, and the American time-use survey 2009. Sampling weight is applied. For Korea, hom
e production includes housework, child-care, and caring and nursing. For Japan, home production includes hous
ework, child-care, caring and nursing, and shopping. For the United States, home production includes househol
d activities, caring for and helping household members, caring for and helping non-household members, consu
mer purchases, professional and personal care services, household services, and government services and civic 
obligations. 
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ratios are negatively correlated with the number of foreign brides (see Table O.1 of the 
Online Appendix for details).  
Relatedly, some may think that regional variation in sex ratios may account for the 
increase in marriage immigrants (e.g., Morgan and Hoffmann (2007)). It is true that, in a 
given year, a man residing in a location with a sex-ratio imbalance (e.g., a farmer in a rural 
area) is more likely to marry a foreign woman. We find, however, that the fraction of single 
men who live in such an area decreased over time, while the prevalence of foreign brides 
increased. Therefore, the sex-ratio imbalance hypothesis alone cannot explain the time trend, 
although it may explain the allocation of foreigners across regions in a given year. 
 
5.2 Male Marriage Immigrants 
Another alternative explanation might be that, developed East Asian countries may have had 
an increase in male marriage immigrants, for example, because of a change in guest-worker 
systems, and this increase may account for the increase of female marriage immigrants. To 
examine this possibility, we report the fraction of native brides who have foreign grooms in 
column 2 of Table 1. Although this fraction is positively correlated with the fraction of 
foreigners among brides in each calendar year, the number of male marriage immigrants is 
much smaller and slowly increasing, compared to female marriage immigrants. Therefore, 
this alternative is unlikely to account for the increase in female marriage immigration in East 
Asia.  
It is worth noting that male marriage immigration in the East Asian countries 
appears not to share the underlying mechanism behind importing foreign brides. First, a 
country’s development status has only a weak correlation with the number of foreign grooms 
marrying native women (columns 3 and 4 of Table 4), different from the case for explaining 
foreign brides (columns 1 and 2 of Table 4). Second, the systematic pattern of international 
marriage that a native person with lower status marries a partner from a less-developed 
country is observed only for marriage between a native groom and a foreign bride, not for 
marriage between a native bride and a foreign groom. For example, native brides who have 
foreign grooms do not necessarily have low socioeconomic status. We estimate a Probit 
model regressing an indicator of having a foreign groom on native brides’ observable 
characteristics. Different from native grooms who have foreign brides (columns 1 and 2 of 
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Table 2), we find that compared to a woman with a white-collar job, a managerial worker is 
more likely to have a foreign groom, and a woman in the agricultural sector is less likely to 
have a foreign groom (columns 3 and 4 of Table 2). This finding is accounted for by the fact 
that, unlike native grooms, brides who have foreign grooms are more diverse in their 
socioeconomic status.  
 
5.3 Sustainability of a Large-Scale Import of Foreign Brides 
Almost all developed countries have had transition periods from traditional gender roles in 
home production toward a modern gender-neutral model (see Fernández, Fogli and Olivetti 
(2004), which explicitly studies an intergenerational mechanism governing gender roles 
across cohorts). Therefore, if developed East Asian countries complete the transition in their 
institutions governing home production and family decisions in the near future, they may no 
longer need mass imports of foreign brides.  
However, we cautiously predict that the prevalence of foreign brides in East Asia 
will persist for two reasons. First, the institutions governing gender roles in home 
production, which affects gains from marriage, seem to change rather slowly in East Asia, 
particularly among men. To confirm this point, we use the World Value Surveys (2005-2006), 
which cover the whole population age 15 and above around the world. The survey includes a 
few questions regarding opinions on gender roles.19 We find that people in developed East 
Asian countries carry more traditional views of women’s roles than other developed 
countries (e.g., the U.S.). As an example, we report our results based on a person’s response 
to the statement, “when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” 
across four countries: Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the U.S. We find that the fraction of men 
who disagreed with that gender-biased statement is much smaller in the East Asian countries 
than the U.S. (i.e., 60% for U.S., 16% for both Japan and Korea, and 36% for Taiwan).20 This 
difference does not shrink even if we control for individual-level characteristics. We estimate 
                                                 
19 Examples include “when jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women,” “men make better 
political leaders,” “university is more important for a boy,” or “men make better business executives than 
women do.” 
20 We do not include Singapore in this analysis because the World Value Survey did not survey Singapore. 
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a Probit model predicting that a respondent would disagree with the statement and report 
marginal effects in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.21  
 
Table 6 Perceived Gender Roles 
Dependent Variable: 1 if a person disagrees with the statement that 
men should have more rights to jobs than women and 0 otherwise 
Probit Model: Marginal effects reported 
 Men  Women  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Japan -0.349*** -0.287*** -0.509*** -0.467*** 
 (0.017) (0.063) (0.018) (0.062) 
Korea -0.381*** -0.157* -0.437*** -0.432*** 
 (0.018) (0.091) (0.022) (0.074) 
Taiwan -0.217*** -0.289*** -0.398*** -0.379*** 
 (0.022) (0.059) (0.023) (0.077) 
Age/10 -0.026*** -0.020* -0.059*** -0.056*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) 
College 0.054** 0.045 0.216*** 0.314*** 
 (0.024) (0.058) (0.027) (0.096) 
Japan × College  -0.002  -0.130 
  (0.077)  (0.108) 
Korea × College  -0.149**  -0.145 
  (0.061)  (0.103) 
Taiwan× College  0.117  -0.053 
  (0.075)  (0.111) 
Japan × Age/10  -0.023  -0.014 
  (0.020)  (0.021) 
Korea × Age/10  -0.052**  0.006 
  (0.021)  (0.022) 
Taiwan× Age/10  0.013  -0.009 
  (0.016)  (0.021) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.18 
Observations 2,287 2,287 2,387 2,387 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Consider column 1 for men’s perceptions. The negative coefficients of Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan imply that, compared to people in the U.S., respondents from the three Asian 
countries are less likely to disagree with the statement that men should have more right to a 
job than women. Column 2 allows for the possibility that educated or younger cohorts in East 
Asian countries may catch up with U.S. gender norms by introducing interaction terms 
                                                 
21 Answer choices are “agree,” “neither,” or “disagree.” Those who “disagree” are coded as the ones who 
disagree with the statement. Our results qualitatively remain the same if we classify “neither” as disagreement 
against the statement or estimate an ordered probit/logit model instead of using a probit model. 
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between a country dummy and education/age slope. For example, if the coefficient of Japan 
× Age/10 or Japan × College is positive, then a younger and more educated Japanese man is 
more likely to avoid the gender-biased view than his counterpart in an older, less-educated 
cohort. Therefore, this suggests the possibility that, as time goes by, Japan may catch up with 
the U.S. in terms of a gender-neutral view of work. However, we find no evidence supporting 
that possibility. The interaction terms are generally insignificant (for Japan and Taiwan) and 
even negative (for Korea). 
In contrast, a larger fraction of female respondents disagreed with that statement 
than men for all countries (75% for the U.S., 20% for Japan, 39% for Korea, and 42% for 
Taiwan). College-educated women are more likely to disagree with the statement than 
women without a college degree, and this tendency is common across the four countries. We 
find no robust relationship, however, between education and responses for men (columns 1 
and 2 of Table 6). This difference across men and women suggests that the expansion of 
higher education in East Asia may widen the gap between men and women in terms of their 
perception of gender roles in market and home production. This gap is captured in our model 
as an insufficient adjustment in institutions governing household decisions and gains from 
marriage, which makes marriage become less attractive among educated women in 
developed East Asian countries. 
In addition, the supply of foreign brides may increase the bargaining position of 
native grooms in East Asian countries and thus slow the change of institutions to reflect 
native women’s improved economic status in gains from marriage. 
The second reason we believe that accepting foreign brides will persist is because of 
the declining cost of immigration. A large body of literature on immigration suggests that a 
person’s cost of immigration to a destination decreases with the size of existing immigrants 
residing in that destination. Therefore, initial international immigration often induces a 
further inflow of immigrants (e.g., Card (1990) and Altonji and Card (1991)). This general 
principle of international migration may well apply to the case of marriage immigration in 
East Asian countries. Therefore, the current mass bride imports have a dynamic effect on 
marriage markets in East Asia by reducing immigration costs, which may sustain or even 




This paper documents the recent yet significant marriage immigration commonly observed in 
developed East Asian countries. Using an economic framework, we explain that this 
phenomenon is accounted for by both rapid advancements in women’s socioeconomic status 
and insufficient adjustment in women’s gains from marriage. We conduct empirical analyses 
using datasets from Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan and find evidence supporting the 
assumptions and the model implications of our economic framework. 
This paper raises various follow-up questions that may lead to fruitful research for 
both researchers and policy makers in the future: How does the large influx of marriage 
immigrants affect natives’ marriage opportunity, marriage surplus, and divorce? To what 
extent will a cross-border marriage be similar to a marriage between two natives in terms of 
fertility, divorce, and other outcomes? How does sending a large number of women to other 
countries as brides affect the brides’ home country, for example, in terms of investment in 
child education and fertility? How much would it be worth to become a marriage immigrant 
for a woman and her family? Would this monetary value be determined similarly to a dowry, 
as observed in India or other societies?22 
Another important area of research will be identifying and explaining the 
socioeconomic factors that affect women’s choice from among possible countries to 
immigrate through cross-border marriages and, likewise, men’s choice of a country from 
which they bring their wives. The results presented in this paper suggest that economic 
factors (e.g., wage gap or trade volumes between two countries) may play an important role 
in explaining marriage immigration. Therefore, a change in a country’s economic status 
could influence marriage immigration accordingly (e.g., rapid development in China may 
reduce the gains of Chinese women becoming marriage immigrants to developed Asian 
countries). In particular, this analysis can help people predict marriage markets in East Asia 
when China becomes a net importer of brides instead of an exporter, and thus competes with 
other developed Asian countries for women from the rest of the world. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Many economists theoretically and empirically study dowries in a marriage market. Examples of such studies 
include Botticini and Siow (2003) and Anderson (2003). 
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As a result of high wage rates in country R, it is easy to show that a married couple prefers 
residing in country R rather than country P (see Online Appendix Section A for proof). Next, 
we examine a person’s net utility from marrying another person. The simplicity of our model 
allows us to have a closed-form solution for a married couple when the couple allocates its 
resources over consumption, leisure, and home production (see Online Appendix Section A 
for details). If a wife participates in market work, we can express her husband’s utility from 
marriage as ܷ௠,௪, 
ܷ௠,௪ ൌ ହଶ lnሺݓ௠ ൅ ݓ௪ሻ െ ݈݊ݓ௠ െ
ଵ
ଶ lnݓ௪ ൅ ݀௠,                  
and the wife’s utility as ܷ௠,௪, 
ܷ௪,௠ ൌ ହଶ lnሺݓ௠ ൅ ݓ௪ሻ െ
ଷ
ଶ lnݓ௪ ൅ ݀௪, 
where ݓ௠and ݓ௪ are wage rates for a husband m and wife w, respectively, and ݀௠ and ݀௪ 
are terms that are not dependent on wage rates. Person i’s utility from being single is 
ܴ௜ ൌ ݈݊ݓ௜ ൅ ݁௜, with ݁௜  as a term that is not dependent on ݓ௜ . Therefore, we can express 
husband m’s net utility from marrying woman w as ௠ܸ,௪, 
௠ܸ,௪ ൌ ହଶ lnሺݓ௠ ൅ ݓ௪ሻ െ 2݈݊ݓ௠ െ
ଵ
ଶ lnݓ௪ ൅ ݀௠ െ ݁௠ െ ߜ1ሺܾ௠ ് ܾ௪ሻ,                     
and wife w’s net utility from marrying man m as, 
௪ܸ,௠ ൌ ହଶ lnሺݓ௠ ൅ ݓ௪ሻ െ
ହ
ଶ lnݓ௪ ൅ ݀௠ െ ݁௠ െ ߜ1ሺܾ௠ ് ܾ௪ሻ,                     
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where ܾ௠  and ܾ௪  are man m and woman w’s country of birth, respectively. With the 
expressions above, we can easily show that ௪ܸ,௠ increases in ݓ௠ and decreases in ݓ௪. See 




We use the “Employment Status Survey (1992, 1997, 2002, 2007)” published by the 
Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications to calculate the sex ratio and 
educational attainment among people aged 20 to 39. We define a person as college-educated 
if he/she attended or has a degree from a 2-year or 4-year college or a polytechnic called 
Kosen. We use the corresponding marriage records from the vital statistics to calculate the 
fraction of foreigners among brides or grooms. By “foreigners,” we mean persons who do not 
hold Japanese citizenship. We obtain micro-level datasets of marriage records for 2000 and 
2005. These two years are selected because occupational information is recoded in years 
ending with 0 or 5.  
 
2.2 Korea 
We use the Korean Population Census to construct educational attainments and sex ratios 
among people whose age is between 20 and 39; the data are available on the website of the 
Korean National Statistical Office. We define a person as college-educated if he/she attended 
or has a degree from a 2-year or 4-year college. We use Korean marriage records, which are 
released as a part of “National Population and Fertility Survey.” We regard a person as a 
marriage immigrant if he/she currently resides outside South Korea and his/her bonjeok is 
outside South Korea. A person’s bonjeok roughly refers to the geographical location where 
the person is originally from and has legal residency. For example, consider a woman who is 
in Seoul as a guest worker but has citizenship in China. In a Korean marriage record, her 
bonjeok is China, although her address is in Seoul. Therefore, we can identify female guest 
workers from female marriage immigrants using both current location and bonjeok. As for 
our micro-level analysis, we use marriage records for 2004 and 2005 only, although we could 
extend our sample to other years of marriage records for the following reasons. The Korean 
Statistical Office changed its classification of countries in 2004. Fewer than 10 categories of 
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countries were used in marriage records prior to 2004, while marriage records from 2004 
onward report the name of the country that a bride/groom resides in and has citizenship from. 
Importantly, some countries that sent a large number of women to Korea as brides (e.g., 
Vietnam and Philippines) were classified as “Other” prior to 2004. Therefore, we choose 
marriage records from 2004 onward for comparability in some of our analyses (e.g., brides’ 
characteristics depending on their home countries). We then limit our analysis to marriage 
records for 2004 and 2005 because our Japanese datasets are available up to 2005. Note that 
our empirical analyses, such as the characteristics of grooms who have a foreign bride, 
remain qualitatively the same when we extend our sample by, for example, including 
marriage records from 1998 to 2003. 
 
2.3 Singapore 
We use the Singaporean Population Census (2000 and 2010, Education of “Resident Non-
student Population”) to compute the educational attainment and sex ratio for individuals aged 
20 to 39. Following the Census classification, we regard a person as having a college 
education if he/she has a diploma from a university, polytechnic, or an equivalent institution. 
To compute the fraction of singles depending on sex and tertiary education, we combine the 
population census and tables from the “Population in Brief 2010” published by the Singapore 
Department of Statistics. “Population in Brief 2010” provides a table reporting the fraction of 
people who remain single depending on multiple levels of educational attainment, as of 1999 
and 2009. We assume that the distribution of educational attainment in 1999 (2009) is the 
same as that in 2000 (2010). For each year, we then compute the fraction of singles among 
college-educated men (women) and among non-college-educated men (women). We refer to 
“Statistics on Marriages & Divorces 2009,” published by the Singapore Department of 
Statistics in 2010, to report the prevalence of cross-border marriages. We consider a person 
as a marriage immigrant if he/she did not have citizenship or permanent residency in 
Singapore but married a Singaporean citizen or permanent resident. 
 
2.4 Taiwan 
We use statistics provided by the Taiwanese Ministry of Education. Using the age- and sex-
specific distribution of educational attainment, we compute the fraction of college-educated 
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among individuals whose age is between 20 and 39 and the sex ratio. We consider a person 
as having a tertiary education if he/she graduated from or attended a 2-year or 4-year college. 
We use the tables from “Marriage Registrations,” available from the Taiwanese National 
Statistics Bureau. Note that the Taiwanese government classifies a person as a “foreigner” if 
the person is neither overseas Taiwanese nor Chinese from Mainland China, Hong Kong, or 
Macao. In contrast, our paper considers a bride from Mainland China, for example, as a 
foreign bride (thus marriage immigrant to Taiwan). The information on the fraction of 
Taiwanese grooms/brides who have a spouse from a foreign country, as defined by the 
Taiwanese government, is available from 1998, but the fraction of Taiwanese grooms/brides 
who married Chinese from Mainland China, Hong Kong, or Macao is available from 2004.  
 
